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The 
Muslim 
Brothers 
Take to the 
Streets
Neil Ketchley
On August 14, 2013, supporters of deposed President Muhammad Mursi were massacred at two 
protest camps in Cairo and Giza. 
In the subsequent four months, the 
Muslim Brothers have regrouped to launch a wave of popular 
protest the likes of which has not been seen in Egypt since 
the January 25 revolution. Under the banner of the National 
Alliance to Support Legitimacy, the Brothers have mounted 
over 1,800 actions in 26 of Egypt’s 27 governorates to call 
for Mursi’s restoration to office and justice for his dead 
supporters. These protests have continued in spite of an 
ongoing crackdown that has claimed the lives of hundreds 
more and seen thousands of Brothers and pro-Mursi 
supporters detained.
Protest Cycles
In an interview with Reuters on August 
15, Muslim Brother spokesman Gihad 
al-Haddad lamented the loss of central 
coordination in the organization, 
claiming that its membership 
was now “beyond control” 
with anger after the killing 
the previous day of more 
than 1,000 Mursi supporters 
in Rabi‘a al-‘Adawiyya and 
al-Nahda Squares. With the 
political process closed by a new 
military-backed government 
seemingly intent on crushing the 
movement, the country appeared 
poised for a return to the state of 
insurgency that prevailed 
in the 1990s, with the frag-
mented Muslim Brothers 
pitted against an entrenched 
security apparatus.
That scenario has not 
come to pass. Not with-
stand ing several episodes 
of violence attributed to 
the movement’s supporters 
in the weeks following the 
massacres, most notably in 
Kirdasa in Giza and Dalga 
in Minya, the Muslim 
Brothers have successfully 
consolidated their organi-
zation to wage a national 
campaign of non-violent 
protest. An “event catalog” 
d r a w n  f ro m  r e p o r t s 
published in the Muslim 
Brothers’ Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP) newspaper, al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala, 
yields an image of a movement that is holding daily 
demonstrations, rallies, “human chains” and sit-ins 
in towns and cities across Egypt.1 The Brothers’ 
transformation into a street protest movement marks 
a rupture with the “accommodationist” strategy, in 
force since the 1980s, which focused the organization’s 
energies on social welfare and Egypt’s parliament 
and professional syndicates.2 Any reading of the 
early history of the Muslim Brothers likewise 
reveals a movement more likely to advance its 
claims through pamphlets and telegrams than 
through mass demonstrations and strikes.3
An aversion to contentious street politics 
remained after the January revolution: 
The Brothers boycotted the regular Friday 
protests that called for social justice and 
an end to military rule, equating the 
revolution’s goals rather with constitu-
tional reform and free elections. That 
first “protest cycle”—defined as “a 
phase of heightened conflict across the 
social system: with a rapid diffusion of 
collective action from more mobilized 
to less mobilized sectors…and sequences 
of intensified interaction between chal-
lengers and authorities”—would culminate 
in the “Friday of the Last Chance” and the 
events of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in 
November 2011.4 In the streets, Egyptians 
were calling upon the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) to relinquish executive A y
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authority to a civilian-led, national salvation government. 
But the Brothers endorsed the SCAF’s rule during that 
episode, insisting that further protest would destabilize the 
country and that “elections are the solution.”5 The Brothers’ 
victories in parliamentary and presidential elections paved 
the way for the second protest cycle of the post-Mubarak 
era: On June 30, 2013, the twenty-fifth milyuniyya (million-
person protest) in eight months brought unprecedented 
numbers outside the Presidential Palace and to the streets 
of downtown Cairo demanding early elections to end the 
presidency of Muhammad Mursi. The military, led by Field 
Marshal ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, seized the protests as a pretext 
to move against Mursi on July 3.
Taking to the Streets
The Muslim Brothers endorsed the SCAF’s rule during 
the first year of the transitional period; they then found 
themselves the subjects of protest after Mursi’s election. Yet 
it is now they who are spearheading the third major protest 
cycle in as many years, with 1,821 protests recorded between 
August and November. In terms of the number of protests, 
this cycle must in fact be considered the largest of the three, 
but it has received little to no coverage in either Egyptian 
or international news media, with the notable exception 
of Al Jazeera Mubashir Misr, the Egypt-focused channel of 
the Qatar-based satellite network. To test for bias in the FJP 
paper’s reporting, a random sample of stories was checked 
against videos uploaded to YouTube and the live streams 
of protests posted daily to the FJP’s website and Facebook 
pages. Tallied against the video evidence, reports proved 
highly accurate, with protest location, size, repertoire, crowd 
composition and instances of state repression all faithfully 
relayed. There is, indeed, sufficient evidence of underre-
porting to conclude that protest frequency is likely to be 
higher still. FJP journalists acknowledge the underreporting; 
they attribute it to the 
challenges of obtaining 
protest reports when 
the paper was being 
clandestinely produced. 
While there was no 
apparent geographic 
bias in report selection, 
larger actions, or those 
that came under attack 
or involved some inno-
vative tactic, were more 
likely to be reported 
on days  with high 
numbers of protests.6 
The newspaper was 
closed on December 
25 by the state-owned 
al-Ahram printing press. Protest reports, replete with links 
to live streams and videos of protests, continue to be posted 
daily on the FJP’s website and social media pages.
The Brothers’ senior leadership is languishing in jail and 
many of its middle-ranking members are in hiding. Protest 
actions are coordinated at the branch level and through 
national groups such as Youth Against the Coup, Women 
Against the Coup, Students Against the Coup, Workers 
Against the Coup and ‘Ulama’ Against the Coup. Of these, 
the most significant are the student and women’s movements, 
whose local offshoots frequently cultivate their own identi-
ties and repertoires. The “7 al-Subh” (7 in the Morning) 
women’s movement is perhaps the best known following 
the detention of 21 of its members: They were given lengthy 
prison sentences (later suspended) after participating in a 
peaceful protest in October.7 Founded in Alexandria and 
now with branches in Cairo and the Nile Delta governorates 
of Buhayra, Sharqiyya, Kafr al-Shaykh and Minufiyya, 7 
al-Subh are known for holding sit-ins and forming human 
chains beside main roads and outside schools during the 
morning rush hour. Other groups, such as Haqqi (My Right), 
a female student movement active in Asyout governorate, 
use social media to publicize their activities, mobilizing in 
tandem with male members of Students Against the Coup 
and others to organize marches through residential areas on 
weekdays. Members of the Ultras Nahdawi also take part in 
these actions. Formed before the coup, the Brothers’ “ultras” 
mimic the hyper-masculine, high-octane performances 
of Egypt’s soccer fans and are tasked with leading chants 
and motivating the crowd. The Ultras Nahdawi have since 
spawned several regional spinoffs, including the Ultras 
al-Rab‘awi, whose members wear specially printed T-shirts, 
play drums and set off fireworks during protests.
These activities are part of a street-level pushback designed 
to mobilize anti-coup sentiment and counter the regime’s 
portrayal of the Brothers as terrorist agents of a foreign 
Post-August 14 Protests, Arrests and Deaths
Number 
of protests
Protest 
arrests
Protest 
deaths
Non-protest 
arrests
August 15–30 306 706 307 289
September 600 297 7 311
October 410 307 44 140
November 505 211 5 128
Total 1,821 1,521 363 868
Data missing from October 13–18. Source: Author’s content analysis of al‑Hurriyya wa al‑‘Adala.
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plot to weaken the country. One popular chant captures 
the protests’ message well: “dihku ‘alayku wa qalu irhab, wa 
ihna giran al-bab fi al-bab” (they fooled you and called us 
terrorists, but we are your next-door neighbors). Protesters 
frequently carry banners and wear clothes branded with 
the four-fingered salute—a gesture that derives from Rabi‘a 
(fourth), first name of the female saint for whom Rabi‘a 
al-‘Adawiyya Square is named, and which has become synon-
ymous with opposition to the military-backed government. 
So popular has this motif become that both government 
supporters and Egyptian activists have adopted their own 
alternative hand gestures in a bid to signal opposition to the 
Brothers. Meanwhile, displaying the Rabi‘a logo has been 
criminalized. A teenager in Kafr al-Shaykh was detained by 
police and jailed after his teachers reported him for having 
the logo stenciled on items of stationery.8
In October, the Brothers also launched the Batiel [sic] 
(Void) petition.9 The petition, which is available online as 
well as being distributed at protests, claims to have gathered 
over 4 million signatures as of November, although there 
is no way to verify the number independently.10 ‘Abd 
al-Rahman Mansour, the campaign’s founder, denies any 
comparison with the Tamarrud (Rebellion) petition that 
rallied popular opposition to President Mursi, but the 
rationale is strikingly similar: The right to govern can be 
revoked through non-violent contention that claims mass 
support.11 Non-violent or not, more than 30 members of the 
Batiel campaign were detained in November for distributing 
the petition.12
Mosque Network
The timing and shape of the Brothers’ contention has 
developed in dynamic relation to a series of blows landed by 
the security apparatus on the movement’s membership and 
infrastructure. In particular, the arm of State Security tasked 
with surveying Egypt’s Islamist movements—reconstituted 
after being nominally disbanded following the January 25 
Student protesters make the four‑finger sign. MOHAMMED ASAD/AP PHOTO
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revolution—looks to be settling old scores, and both current 
and former Brothers are caught in the dragnet. The Brothers’ 
offices and party buildings, many established following 
the January 25 revolution, have largely been abandoned. 
Mosques are now the staging point for nearly 40 percent of 
protests, with over a third of all actions launched following 
the conclusion of prayer. As a result, police have raided 
mosques associated with the Brothers and prohibited the 
imams from giving the Friday sermon. In September, the 
Ministry of Religious Endowments announced that only 
graduates of al-Azhar would be allowed to deliver sermons, 
while optimistically pledging to close the tens of thousands of 
unlicensed mosques that have proliferated in recent decades 
despite numerous attempts at regulation.13
Violent suppression of protest, which peaked in the weeks 
following the August 14 massacres, has now settled into a 
fairly predictable rhythm. Rallies held after Friday prayer 
and symbolic milyuniyyas, such as those called to mark the 
anniversary of the October 1973 war, are the most frequently 
attacked, especially if they approach a major square or 
pass government buildings. Attempts to reoccupy a square 
in central Cairo, the first of which was made at Ramses 
Square on August 16, have been thwarted by security forces, 
who use live ammunition to disperse protesters. In several 
Egyptian cities, major squares and other 
public spaces have been sealed off by 
a regime fearful of challenges to its 
authority. Cairo’s Rabi‘a al-‘Adawiyya 
Square, in particular, is locked down on 
Fridays. The government, meanwhile, 
has sought to paper over the massacre 
that took place there, installing a 
pro-army memorial to commemorate 
those killed.14 Weekday protests are 
often held at night to avoid detection, 
beginning after the nighttime prayer 
and remaining small and highly mobile, 
capable of disappearing down residen-
tial side streets if confronted by police 
or regime thugs. In areas where protests 
have been particularly harshly policed, 
anti-coup protesters have adopted 
farasha (butterfly) tactics—holding a 
sit-in or rally that lasts 15 minutes, and 
then departing to the next location.
In the  months  leading up to 
December, protest has been concen-
trated in Greater Cairo and Alexandria. 
In Alexandria, the districts of Sidi Bishr, 
al-Raml, Abu Sulayman, al-Muntaza 
and al-‘Asafira have emerged as leading 
centers of opposition to the coup, in 
turn witnessing some of the worst 
repression since the August killings. In 
October, Alexandria’s iconic Corniche became a focal point 
for protest, prompting security forces to deploy in large 
numbers to deny the space to protesters. In Cairo, meanwhile, 
neighborhoods in Helwan, Nasr City, al-Zaytoun and Maadi 
host weekly protests. Towns and cities in Giza, al-Sharqiyya 
and Asyout have also seen hundreds of protests, as have the 
Delta governorates. What is perhaps most surprising given 
the historic association between the Brothers and the Suez 
Canal cities is the relative absence of protest in Ismailiyya (38 
protests), where the movement was founded, or in the Suez 
governorate (18 protests). It was in these areas, it should be 
noted, that opposition to Mursi’s presidency first emerged 
in early 2013, in the form of attacks against the Brothers and 
FJP’s offices. Lately, the cities of Ismailiyya and Suez have 
played host to “butterfly” protests, suggesting that while the 
Brothers maintain a presence in these areas, their ability to 
operate remains severely restricted.
The Youth Get Involved
The frequency and distribution of protests staged between 
August and December suggest that while the Brothers 
have successfully mobilized their core supporters, they are 
struggling to open new fronts against the coup. Moreover, 
Source: Author’s content analysis of al‑Hurriyya wa al‑‘Adala.
Protest frequency by governorate, August 15–November 30, 2013. Cairo and Alexandria saw 
the most action.
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in recent months, the numbers participating in protests 
look to be getting smaller. As late as September, rallies 
were regularly attracting tens and sometimes hundreds of 
thousands of participants, outraged by the mass killing of 
pro-Mursi supporters in August. The masira hashida (massing 
rally) was typical: Protesters would depart one mosque after 
Friday prayer and proceed to several others, picking up 
the congregants, before moving to the next neighborhood, 
where they would join up with a second rally and march 
to a common destination. Inevitably, the marchers in these 
highly visible protests would clash with security forces. In 
the days and weeks following a large protest, organizers 
would also be targeted for arrest. One consequence is that 
protest has become noticeably more diffuse while remaining 
localized, with rallies increasingly sticking to one residen-
tial area. The security forces encourage this trend, often 
blocking the main artery leading to the neighboring district 
in active protest areas. In explaining the concentration of 
protest in certain neighborhoods, a key factor appears to 
be the availability of a mosque or some other associational 
space in which to organize. In Helwan, for example, 28 
protest actions had been launched from al-Marghi mosque 
by the end of November. Since then, however, the security 
forces have targeted the mosque, deploying at prayer time 
to intercept any post-prayer rallies. As a result, protest in 
Helwan has declined, although the Brothers seemingly retain 
the support of large sections of the community, with local 
street vendors marketing their wares next to Rabi‘a signs 
and posters of Mursi.
The Brothers appear conscious that for their protests to 
become truly disruptive, they will have to tap into new, as 
yet unmobilized sectors of Egyptian society. In October, 
a Workers Against the Coup move-
ment was formed in Alexandria, 
ostensibly with the aim of brokering 
new relationships with Egypt’s trade 
unions. The results are limited thus 
far, with the movement holding 
only a handful of minor actions. It 
is on university campuses that the 
Brothers and their National Alliance 
to Support Legitimacy have made 
significant inroads. Students Against 
the Coup, formed by the Brothers’ 
youth section, has brought the move-
ment to the faculties and housing 
complexes of Egypt’s public and 
private universities. As a result, the 
Brothers have managed to maintain 
the protests’ momentum during the 
week in spite of the decline in non-
student participation outside of the 
Friday rallies. They have been helped 
in this regard by the state’s decision 
to deploy security forces on campus, which has galvanized 
student opposition to the regime. Subsequent heavy-handed 
policing of student protest, beginning with the arrest and 
wounding of students at al-Azhar University in late October, 
has provoked a wave of solidarity demonstrations, sit-ins and 
strikes at al-Azhar’s branches across the country, as well as 
at the universities of Cairo, ‘Ayn Shams, Asyout, Zaqaziq, 
Mansoura and several others. Since November, these protests 
have bucked the general trend, growing in frequency and size 
as students coordinate their actions across several faculties. At 
Asyout University, eight members of the university’s teaching 
committee were fired for organizing protests.15
Secondary schools also briefly became host to sit-ins and 
rallies in September, coinciding with the beginning of the 
new school year. It was often school-age relatives of those 
arrested and killed who led the way. Ensuing backlash from 
the state has seen tens of students detained and hundreds 
suspended, and has triggered a heightened police and army 
presence on school premises. The national anthem, typically 
played at the beginning of the school day, was replaced with 
a pro-military song, “Tislam al-Ayadi” (Bless Those Hands), 
which was composed in July 2013 to fête the army’s role in 
removing Mursi. The number of protests held at secondary 
schools dropped off dramatically by the beginning of 
October, with no explanation from the Brothers. Probably, 
it is simply easier to intimidate secondary school students 
than university goers.
One striking commonality of the protests is the limited 
participation of other political movements besides a narrow 
band of Islamist fellow travelers, a point indicative of the 
Brothers’ political isolation. The Brothers’ invitation to 
Egypt’s activists to put aside their differences and unite 
Weekday protest frequency and location. Data missing from October 13–18.
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against the military must be read against this backdrop.16 The 
invitation was floated following the state’s violent dispersal of 
a protest by a “who’s who” of Egyptian activists on the day in 
November that saw a new anti-demonstration law come into 
effect. The offer has thus far not been taken up, testimony to 
the mistrust among many for the Brothers since they effec-
tively sided with the SCAF during the transitional period. 
There is also the bitter memory of the repression of several 
protests against Mursi as president, most notably outside 
the Presidential Palace in early 2013 and in front of the 
Brothers’ headquarters in Muqattam, Cairo. Such episodes 
were replete with hand-to-hand fighting between anti-Mursi 
protesters and Brothers bussed in to defend the buildings. 
The Brothers reply that they inherited a profoundly hostile 
“deep state” that sought to frustrate efforts at reform and 
foment unrest. In interviews published after the coup, 
mid-ranking Brothers have gone further, acknowledging 
that the movement’s endorsement of the SCAF-supervised 
transition allowed the fuloul, the remnants of the Mubarak 
regime, to regroup in the year prior to Mursi’s election, while 
hastening the breakup of the revolutionary coalition that 
ousted Mubarak.17
On the second anniversary of the killing of protesters 
by soldiers and members of the security apparatus on 
Muhammad Mahmoud Street on November 19, 2011, the 
Brothers’ youth wing declared their solidarity with the fami-
lies of the martyrs and the wounded. Anticipating hostility, 
however, they elected to stay away from the planned protests 
in Tahrir.18 Instead, a commemorative protest was called 
outside Qasr al-Qubba, a popular terminus for the Friday 
rallies that begin in northeast Cairo. The Brothers’ decision 
proved prescient. Above Muhammad Mahmoud Street a 
banner was hung that read: “No fuloul, no military, no 
Brothers.” It thus remains a distant prospect that the latest 
protest cycle will produce a broader coalition of political 
forces capable of weathering repression and overturning the 
counter-revolutionary gains of the old order.
Postscript
On December 25, the Brothers were declared a terrorist 
organization, with stiff penalties imposed against supporters 
of the movement and those found participating in pro-
Mursi protests. In the days immediately following the 
designation, protest was particularly harshly policed, with 
hundreds of arrests made and several protesters killed. Over 
a thousand of the Brothers’ charitable organizations have 
since been closed and members, both former and current, 
have had their assets frozen. This measure followed a 
series of bombings in Cairo and the Nile Delta that have 
been attributed to the Brothers, claims that have yet to 
be substantiated and should be treated with skepticism. 
The Muslim Brothers have achieved much in the last four 
months through non-violent means, despite an onslaught 
of state repression. There is no discernible advantage in 
adopting violent methods now.
On January 14–15, Egyptians approved a new constitution 
to replace the 2012 constitution that the Muslim Brothers 
had a large hand in drafting. The Brothers insisted that 
the 2012 constitution should remain in force and called on 
supporters to boycott the vote. Protesters took this message 
to the streets as part of the daily protests, chanting “al-Sisi 
qatil wa dusturu batil” (al-Sisi is a killer and his constitution 
is void). While the military-backed government urged a 
“yes” vote, the Brothers launched the “Your Voice Is Wasted” 
campaign, while calling on Egyptian expatriates to hold 
demonstrations outside of Egyptian embassies. They also 
formed the “3 at Night” movement to deface the ubiquitous 
“yes to the constitution” posters. Long-simmering tensions 
between the Brothers and the salafi Nour Party came to 
the surface in the run-up to voting, with the latter openly 
campaigning for a “yes” vote, prompting anti-Nour chants 
and denunciations from members of the National Coalition 
to Support Legitimacy. The protests themselves have other-
wise continued, although university campuses have calmed 
somewhat as students sit for their end-of-term exams amidst 
a heavy security presence. Any dialogue between the Brothers 
and the military—rumored since the July coup—appears to 
be dead. The government now seems intent on boxing in the 
Brothers to an ever smaller social space while it consolidates 
its own position, a reflection of its inability to date to land a 
knockout blow against what remains of Egypt’s largest and 
best organized political movement. ■
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